Liberal Zionism: A Retrospective
A response to Zack Beauchamp’s “The return of liberal Zionism?”
This is a response to Zack Beauchamp’s “The return of liberal Zionism?” article published two weeks ago in Vox. Beauchamp’s piece is thought-provoking, and I agree with some sections of it. However, if one is to champion the ostensible return of an ideology, we must analyze what outcomes it produced when practiced and implemented. Liberal Zionism’s recent track record leaves a lot to be desired for those who care about Palestinian equality, self-determination, and hopefully one day flourishing.
Beauchamp notes that “Israel declared in-principle allegiance to liberal ideals from the get-go”, citing the country’s declaration of independence calling for equal social and political rights irrespective of religion, race, or sex. To his credit, he admits that “Arabs experienced the state very differently”, he then recounts the horrors of the Nakba and the imposition of Israeli military rule onto the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Yet, the ambit of Beauchamp’s optimism for liberal reform should be limited to domestic concerns like judicial integrity and independence. In the United States, there is increasing divergence between the moderate-to-progressive preferences of most voters and the Republican Party’s increasingly theocratic and anti-democratic inclinations.
Yet in Israel, this is not the case. In 2016, 48 percent of Israeli high school students indicated that they do not think Arab Israeli citizens should have the right to vote. Now, those under 30 are the most ardent supporters of the furthest right elements of Netanyahu’s coalition. Even centrist politicians like Yair Lapid and Benny Gantz are urging the White House to not even publicly discuss the possibility of a 2-state solution.
There is a fundamental aversion to Arab self-governance and political participation within the Israeli body politic and its representatives. Unless this disinclination is overcome, there is no room for Beauchamp’s optimism.
Eventually, Israel’s indiscriminate bombing campaign in Gaza will stop. Maybe soon, Israel will no longer have a national security minister who honors a terrorist who killed 29 civilians in a mosque. Or one who has meted out 10,000 guns to West Bank settlers that they have used to kill 303 Palestinian civilians. Maybe the next Israeli government will not indirectly fund Hamas to undermine the peace process.
When that time comes, a framework for long-term peace, self-determination, and equality for the Palestinians must be prioritized. Beauchamp’s bullish assessment of liberal Zionism requires an analysis of Israel’s last two Labor Party Prime Ministers (Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak) and how they engaged with the Palestinians.
An Israeli government in the mold of Rabin or Barak would be vastly preferable to the status quo. Yet, their attempts to improve relations with the Palestinians at best leave a lot to be desired and at worst built a foundation for the Netanyahus, Ben-Gvirs, and Smotrichs of the world to enact their most insidious desires.
Beauchamp is correct that it is difficult for Jews to feel safe when ostensible allies celebrate or tacitly endorse Hamas’ brutal terrorism and antisemitism.
However, let’s maintain perspective. The occasional errant college student or DSA chapter does not have real power over the conduct of Palestinian political actors. The Israeli government does. Even the most benevolent and liberal Israeli governments have required Palestinians to concede more territory. Yet, they haven’t even granted Palestinians full control over their security, water, or ability to reliably reunite with their displaced families.
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (L) shaking hands with PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat (R) at the White House lawn, marking the beginning of the Oslo Accords, September 13, 1993.
Oslo Accords
Beauchamp understandably laments the fact that “…the peace process collapsed into violence…” following the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Yet, he portrays the 2000s as “a decade of nearly continuous war with Palestinians” where liberal Zionism “was a casualty of these conflicts.”
This obituary and ode to liberal Zionism ignores how it failed to ameliorate the structural issues that fertilize violence.
Rabin was by no means a peacenik. As Defense Minister during the first Intifada (1987-1993) he earned the moniker of “bone crusher”, ordering soldiers to brutally break the limbs of protestors they captured. Yet, Rabin was not a rigid ideologue. He understood that failing to offer any hope for the Palestinians would ignite endless violent intifadas. A realpolitik of maintaining Israel’s security interests motivated his diplomatic posture towards the Palestinians. When he and his Labor government came into power in 1993, forging a diplomatic resolution was the top priority.
The Oslo Accords are a pair of interim agreements signed by the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) that provide a template for Palestinian self-government.
Some promising concessions by the PLO include disavowal of terrorism as a legitimate political vehicle and recognition of Israel's right to exist. Meanwhile, Israel recognized the PLO as the government of the Palestinian people and established the Palestinian Authority (PA) to govern Gaza and the West Bank. Additionally, a legislative body - the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) was created for the Palestinians.
While the PA exercises full control of the Gaza Strip, less ideally, the West Bank was partitioned into three administrative zones:
Area A (comprising 18% of the total territory): PA has authority over internal security and civil administration.
Area B (comprising 22% of the total territory): Israel is responsible for internal security and the PA has civil jurisdiction.
Area C (60% of the total territory): Israel controls civil administration and internal security.
Notably, Area C is the largest, most resource-abundant, and only contiguous section of the West Bank. Therefore, while the PA was granted full control over the Gaza Strip, Israel fully ceded less than one-fifth of the West Bank (a land mass that is over 15 times larger than the Gaza Strip and is home to almost 1 million more residents).
Settlements under Rabin
Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip is illegal under international law (as reaffirmed by the Obama Administration). The Oslo Accords contain loopholes which enable Israeli settlers to circumnavigate restrictions on settlement construction. The agreement does not bind Israel to any explicit promises. It even states that "Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations."
Oslo stipulated that the permanent status negotiations were to take place by May 1999. However, Rabin's assassination in 1995 and the growing political influence of Likud and Netanyahu (elected Prime Minister the following year) unfortunately put a dent in these ambitions. No formal commitment to halt construction opened the door for Netanyahu to overturn Rabin's de facto partial settlement freeze.
While Rabin initiated a nominal "settlement freeze" in 1992, many caveats were baked into his directive. For example, ongoing construction was not subject to the freeze. Therefore - 10,000 housing units were exempted from it - yielding a 50% increase in settlement expansion under Rabin. From 1994-1995, the Israeli Housing Ministry approved the construction of 5,000 housing units in the West Bank. This resulted in a 5 percent annual increase in the settler population.
Freedom of Movement under Rabin
An additional loophole exempted new roads from Rabin's settlement policy. These roads reduced commute times, making it more convenient to travel from Israel to the West Bank.
For decades, movement between Israel and the Palestinian-occupied territories contained few restrictions. However, beginning in 1991, Palestinians looking to enter either Israel or East Jerusalem were required to obtain a personal travel permit from the Israeli government. This policy effectively codified the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip as increasingly segmented entities.
Notably, under Rabin in 1993, the number of permits issued not only declined but more barriers were erected. The Rabin government installed military checkpoints separating the West Bank from Israel, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. These checkpoints are intended to enforce "complete closures" enacted during times of perceived heightened security risk. However, these "complete closures" are also increasingly imposed during Jewish holidays.
Once these restrictions are announced, all travel permits are nullified. The permit process has gradually become more arduous over the accompanying decades. Permits into Israel from the West Bank are typically separated into two categories: short-term, and "specific purpose." Short-term travel permits are limited to three months (with an appeals process potentially allowing for a 3-month emergency extension). The "specific purpose" permits (i.e., specialized academics, tech workers) are limited to 1-year (with a potential extension of up to 27 months).
Once these permits expire, you're back to square one. There is no "pathway to citizenship" or even permanent resident status available to you. A Rabin-led Labor government is vastly preferable to one commandeered by Netanyahu and his cabinet of fundamentalists and fascists. Yet, it is revisionism to laud Rabin's tenure as one of genuine liberal reform, rather than one still blinkered by Israeli "security concerns" as superseding Palestinian freedom and equality.
Today, while Israelis can freely move into most of the West Bank (aside from Area A), West Bank Palestinians are subjected to 645 checkpoints. Thus, a trip from Ramallah to Jerusalem takes an average of 20 minutes for an Israeli citizen and can take several hours for a Palestinian seeking to make the same trip.
Population Registry under Rabin
An important breakthrough of the Oslo Accords centered around the Palestinian population registry. While the agreement transferred administrative control of the registry to the Palestinian Authority, Israel still approves family reunification applications. Israel processed 35,000 family reunification permits in the late aughts. However, this number eventually dwindled to a couple thousand at the beginning of this decade and is effectively defunct now.
Since 2009, the family reunification process has been effectively frozen, with rare exceptions made for dire humanitarian concerns. Entire families are increasingly dependent on the burdensome, piecemeal, and temporary visa process if they want to see each other. The restrictions enacted under Rabin's watch have been weaponized by successive governments who have had no intention of using the Oslo Accords as a "template" for "further dialogue."
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak (L) with PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat (R) at Camp David, July 2000.
The Barak Era
For three years (1996-1999), Netanyahu and his Likud government refused to build on Rabin's agreement. This is not surprising considering Netanyahu held a mock funeral procession portraying Rabin dead in a casket only 4 months before Rabin was assassinated by a far-right Israeli terrorist.
Yet in 1999 Likud lost the Knesset elections and Netanyahu's first stint as Prime Minister ended. Under Labor Prime Minister Ehud Barak (1999-2001), Israel's liberals had an opportunity to resurrect and bolster Rabin's diplomatic legacy. Barak found a willing partner in the White House, with President Bill Clinton looking to cap off his Presidency by cementing his diplomatic bona fides.
Between July 11 and 25, 2000 Bill Clinton hosted Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak at the White House for the Camp David Summit. While Clinton blamed Arafat’s recalcitrance for the negotiation’s failure, the deal had some key shortcomings that understandably made the Palestinians feel jilted.
Camp David Summit Key Provisions
The Camp David Summit was advertised by the White House and the Israeli government as “generously” pledging 91% of the West Bank to a future Palestinian state.
Yet, Israel maintained control over some key aspects of Palestinian sovereignty:
a. Control of the Jordan River Valley (major source of clean drinking water for the West Bank)
b. Refused to allow a prospective Palestinian state to establish its own military.
c. The proposal would have functionally split the West Bank into 2 parts, despite Palestinians wanting a contiguous Palestinian state.
d. No right to return offered for Palestinian refugees expelled during the Nakba.
e. There are competing definitions of what constitutes the "West Bank" (Palestinians consider post-1967 East Jerusalem, Dead Sea territorial waters as part of the West Bank. Israel doesn't). Therefore, this reduces the proportion of the West Bank pledged to Palestinians from the stated 91% down to 86%.
f. A land swap proposal where Israel would grant a percentage of Israel-proper to a Palestinian state, in exchange for parts of the West Bank where settlements had been built. However, this would have been the equivalent of Israel offering the Palestinians 1% of the West Bank while annexing 9% of it (in pure landmass terms).
When accounting for competing definitions, the land swap proposal, and non-contiguity, only 77% of the West Bank was offered for a future Palestinian state in practice. Notably, the West Bank & the Gaza Strip only account for 22% of the land encompassing Israel and the Palestinian occupied territories. This is already only half of the land pledged to the Palestinians under the initial UN partition plan of 1947.
If the Palestinians are the ones who are constantly surrendering land, then it is ridiculous to assert that they are being uncompromising for refusing to give up more land. Additionally, while Israel has a right to defend itself, how can the same be said for the Palestinians if they are prohibited from establishing their own military?
Israel controls where and how water can be distributed and used from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River. Palestinians residing in the majority of the West Bank must receive Israeli permission for any wells they wish to drill, waste treatment plants they wish to build, or water grids they wish to connect. While Israel is allowed to export water into the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority is prohibited from transporting water from one part of the West Bank to another.
This has led to an imbalance where the per capita consumption for an Israeli settlement is 247 liters of water per person, meanwhile, this number stands at 82.4 for West Bank Palestinians (below the World Health Organization recommendation of 100 liters of water consumption per person).
Final Thoughts
There are some broader philosophical questions worth delving into regarding the formation of Israel. At the dawn of mass decolonization (beginning with India’s independence in August 1947), Israel was formed at the expense of about 750,000 Palestinians expelled from their homes. Almost around the same time the vestiges of apartheid rule in the United States were being dismantled with the passage of the Civil Rights Act (1964) and the Voting Rights Act (1965), Israel was expanding and entrenching the scope of its apartheid rule with the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967.
Principles of pluralism, secularism, and democracy are demonstrably the most effective ways to achieve peace, security, and prosperity. If a two-state solution is no longer on the table, then let’s look at what a one-state solution would entail.
In December 2016 during a farewell speech to the U.N., Secretary of State John Kerry proclaimed that, “If the choice is one state, Israel can either be Jewish or democratic, it cannot be both...”
This quote by Kerry reveals an uncomfortable truth. A government that prioritizes one ethnic or religious group over another will never produce peace, stability, or democracy, even for the dominant group. Israeli Jews are also unsafe when their government props up terrorist groups like Hamas with goal of driving a wedge among Palestinians. They are left unsafe when a hypermilitarized society produces IDF soldiers who murder Israeli hostages who they are ostensibly meant to protect. They are also left unsafe when Palestinians are relegated to immiseration and desperation. These are the conditions that terrorist groups use as recruiting tools.
When Israel’s liberals regain power, they cannot view the Palestinians as a mere security nuisance like Rabin and Barak. Additional territorial concessions by the Palestinians without a framework for democratic governance, defense capabilities, water rights, and the end to settler violence and occupation in the West Bank is woefully insufficient.